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Summary 
The UN Conference on Financing for Development in Addis 
Ababa in July 2015 will pave the way for the implementation 
of the post-2015 development agenda. The Briefing Paper 
series “Financing Global Development“ analyses key financial 
and non-financial means of implementation for the new 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and discusses 
building blocks of a new framework for development finance. 
In many developing and emerging economies, central 
banks have begun over the past decade to place renewed 
emphasis on the promotion of economic development 
and structural transformation, looking beyond narrow 
mandates for macroeconomic stability. Developmental 
central bank policies have included policies directed at 
financial sector development, the promotion of financial 
inclusion and aligning the financial system with 
sustainable development. 
This marks a shift from the orthodoxy that has dominated 
central banking since the 1980s and that has been 
promoted in developing countries by institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multilateral 
development banks. The orthodox approach to central 
banking – according to which central banks should primari-
ly focus on price stability – has been severely undermined 
by the global financial crisis. It has become clear that 
central banks also ought to take responsibility for  
safeguarding financial stability. Moreover, in the aftermath 
of the crisis, many central banks have adopted 
unconventional policies to address problems of debt, 
stagnation and deflation. This has opened up a new 
discussion on the scope of – and limits to – the mandate of 
central banks. In practice, many central banks in developing 
countries nowadays proactively seek to promote sustain-
able economic development. Specifically, an increasing 
number of central banks and financial regulators have 
become active in promoting financial inclusion and in 
greening financial systems, rendering them important – 
albeit in international policy discussions often underrated – 
actors in development financing. 
Widening the mandate of central banks can help to 
promote sustainable economic development by improving 
the framework conditions for financing the post-2015 
development agenda. However, a wider mandate un-
doubtedly complicates matters, as developmental objec-
tives may at times conflict with stability objectives. As 
central bank mandates widen, it will therefore be important 
to reform central bank policy frameworks with a view 
towards addressing the risks arising from a wider central 
bank mandate. The reform of central bank policy 
frameworks may help to ensure that central banks promote 
economic development and stability in a balanced manner, 
and thus be an important building block of a new 
framework for development finance. 
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The changing role of central banks 
Since the 1980s, a broad consensus emerged among 
economists regarding the role and mandate of central 
banks. Central banks, it was widely believed, should focus 
their energies on maintaining price stability and refrain 
from any other goals, such as growth and employment 
generation, that may be in conflict with this goal. Safe-
guarding price stability, it was argued, would be the best 
contribution that central banks could make to economic 
growth and development. This thinking was best 
embodied in the concept of “inflation targeting” (IT), a 
monetary policy strategy in which the central bank publicly 
announces a medium-term inflation target and adjusts its 
policy rates in order to meet this target. Numerous central 
banks all over the world, in advanced and developing 
economies alike, have adopted IT frameworks. Inter-
national financial organisations such as the World Bank 
and the IMF have promoted IT in developing economies as 
being the state of the art of central banking, along with 
financial market and capital account liberalisation as well as 
flexible exchange rates. 
The IT orthodoxy has had serious implications for 
economic policy-making in developing economies, since 
central banks with a narrow IT mandate cannot assume the 
“developmental” role that central banks have historically 
played in virtually all of today’s advanced economies in 
supporting financial sector and industrial development. 
Moreover, a narrow focus on inflation may keep the central 
bank from responding adequately to supply or terms-of-
trade shocks and risks to financial stability. 
The global financial crisis has led to a rethinking of the 
prevailing consensus in central banking – which then-IMF 
Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard dismissed in a speech as 
“a one target one instrument world” – which, despite its 
analytical rigour, was not fit for purpose. Indeed, not only 
have central banks around the world rediscovered their 
financial stability mandates, they have also adopted all 
kinds of unconventional monetary policies in the after-
math of the global financial crisis in order to deal with 
problems of debt, stagnation and deflation. In developing 
countries, central banks and financial regulatory authorities 
are confronted with further challenges, including the 
promotion of financial development and inclusion as well 
as the pressing question of how to align the financial 
system with sustainable development. 
Historical experiences with developmental central 
bank mandates 
When reassessing the mandate of central banks, it is worth 
looking at the developmental roles they historically played 
in advanced and developing countries until the 1980s. 
Central banks in today’s developed countries played 
important roles in rebuilding their economies following the 
Great Depression and the Second World War, utilising a 
variety of credit allocation techniques, which were 
supported by capital and exchange controls (Epstein, 
2006). In Japan, for instance, the central bank supported 
the government’s industrial policy through credit allo-
cation policies. In France, Italy and Belgium, central banks 
used variable asset-based reserve requirements, lowering 
required reserve rates on privileged assets to promote 
lending to desired sectors such as manufacturing. In the 
United Kingdom and the United States, the Bank of 
England and the Federal Reserve played promotional roles 
by supporting the growth of the financial sector. 
In many developing economies, central banks were assigned 
developmental mandates when they were established to 
promote weakly developed private sectors. Besides using 
capital and exchange controls, central banks intervened 
directly in financial sectors to facilitate access to credit for 
priority sectors. In India, for instance, the central bank used 
regulations which required banks that wanted to open 
branches in urban areas to open branches also in unbanked 
locations. One of the instruments used by the central bank 
of Nigeria was the provision of capital to development 
financing institutions. In Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 
central banks used variable asset-based reserve requirements 
to influence the sectoral allocation of credit. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, major central bank policy reforms 
took place in developing countries to orient central bank 
policy towards the promotion of price stability. The main 
reasons for this turnaround were the rise of neoliberal 
economic thinking and, correspondingly, a change in 
donors’ priorities. Another important reason was the 
perceived failure of developmental central banking policies. 
Although the effectiveness of such policies varied from 
country to country, there was broad agreement that they 
were often ineffective at best, for example often benefiting 
only narrow interest groups within the state or the private 
sector rather than the broader economy (Dafe, 2012). 
A developmental role for central banks – Back to 
the future? 
Over the past decade, many central banks in developing 
and emerging economies have begun to place renewed 
emphasis on the promotion of economic development and 
structural transformation, looking beyond narrow 
mandates for macroeconomic stability. The greater appeal 
of alternative approaches to central banking is related to 
the blatant failure of the neoliberal economic model as well 
as the apparent success of more interventionist, 
developmental approaches followed by several East Asian 
economies, including Japan, Korea and China. One area 
where an increasing number of central banks have become 
active is improving financial inclusion. 
In many developing countries, central banks and financial 
regulators have been at the forefront of promoting access 
to financial services (see Figure 1). Since 2011, central 
banks from countries as varied as Uganda, Nepal and 
Ecuador have for instance signed the Maya Declaration, an  
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Fig. 1: Intensity of trade finance in emerging markets (ratio 
of trade finance to trade in goods, in percentage) 
Note: Results are based on a sample of 142 economies, of which 
98 are developing countries. 
Source: CGAP. (2010). Financial access 2010. The state of 
financial inclusion through the crisis. Washington, DC: 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and World 
Bank Group, p. 18. 
international initiative in which countries make measurable 
commitments to promote financial inclusion. The 
instruments used by central banks to promote financial 
inclusion vary significantly across countries. Consumer 
protection and financial literacy have become important 
areas of central bank engagement in a variety of countries. 
In Armenia, for example, the central bank established a 
consumer protection and financial education centre. 
Proportionate regulation, which considers the implications 
of financial regulation for both financial stability and finan-
cial inclusion, has become a guiding principle for many 
central banks. Kenya’s central bank has been at the fore-
front of promoting the principle of proportionality, pro-
viding an enabling regulatory environment for the pro-
vision of mobile payment services, which allowed for their 
rapid expansion. Central bank promotion of small and 
medium enterprise (SME) and agricultural finance has also 
been on the rise. In Nigeria and Pakistan, for instance, the 
central banks established SME and agricultural credit 
guarantee schemes in recent years; the central bank of 
Bangladesh regularly organises training programmes for 
SME entrepreneurs. Compared to the period before the 
1980s, central bank policies to promote financial inclusion 
in developing countries tend to be more market-based, 
more focussed on institution-building and rely more on 
technical solutions to reduce the costs of financial services 
provision rather than on public subsidies and direct 
intervention in financial institutions’ lending activities. 
The greening of the financial system 
A second area where a growing number of central banks and 
financial regulators have become active is the greening of 
financial systems. There are important reasons why central 
banks should care about environmental risk (Volz, 2014). 
First, environmental risk – and risk arising from climate 
change in particular – constitutes a significant systemic risk 
for the real economy, and therefore also for the financial 
sector. Second, the provision of finance for socially un-
desirable activities – such as carbon-intensive businesses – 
can be characterised as a market failure. Environmental 
regulation and carbon pricing should be the preferred policy 
tools to correct this market failure and discourage such 
investments. Yet, as long as carbon-pricing markets are not 
functioning and no effective environmental policies are in 
place, there may be a case for financial authorities to use 
their powers to affect credit creation and allocation. Third, 
the case for an environmental role for financial authorities 
can be made for developing countries, where these institu-
tions typically have a strong institutional standing in the 
policy framework, whereas environmental authorities lack 
clout. 
A number of central banks and financial regulatory 
authorities are the vanguard that has already stood up to the 
challenge of climate change and environmental degradation. 
Already in 2011, the central bank of Bangladesh introduced 
a comprehensive green banking framework. In 2012, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission issued Green Credit 
Guidelines “for the purpose of encouraging banking institutions 
to, by focusing on green credit, actively adjust credit structure, 
effectively fend off environmental and social risks, better serve 
the real economy, and boost the transformation of economic 
growth mode and adjustment of economic structure”. In 2014, 
the Chinese central bank launched a Green Finance Task Force. 
The same year, the Indonesian Financial Services Authority 
published a Roadmap for Sustainable Finance in Indonesia 
(Volz, 2015), whereas Mongolia’s central bank launched the 
Mongolian Sustainable Finance Principles and Sector Guidelines, 
a voluntary framework to support local banks in integrating 
environmental and social considerations into lending 
decisions and product design. For sure, all of these 
frameworks have their shortcomings, and the effects they 
have had on financial markets have been negligible to date. 
But we are just seeing the beginning of a greater trend, in 
which central banks and financial authorities are starting to 
respond to the challenges posed by climate change by 
requiring adequate management and disclosure of climate 
and other environmental risks from financial firms. 
Challenges arising from a wider mandate 
However, a wider central bank mandate may not only have 
benefits but it would also raise new challenges. There are at 
least three main risks of mandating central banks with 
developmental or environmental objectives. First, tradeoffs 
may arise in achieving developmental and stabilisation 
objectives. On a functional level, central banks will 
encounter problems if they are supposed to achieve too 
many objectives and have too few policy instruments at 
their disposal, as described by the so-called Tinbergen rule. 
Second, assigning central banks a wider mandate may be 
dangerous, as it may vest too much power in institutions 
that have only limited accountability. In many countries 
where central banks are seeking to play a promotional role, 
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tically evaluated, and the effectiveness of policies is not 
regularly reported. 
Third, where central banks are assigned a wider, develop-
mental mandate, they may face significant political pressure 
to pursue developmental policies at the expense of stability, 
particularly where central bank independence is limited, as is 
the case in many developing countries. The history of central 
banking is full of examples in which central banks have been 
used by governments to monetise public debt. 
Balancing development and stability – The way 
forward 
Over the past decade, many central banks in developing and 
emerging economies have begun to place renewed 
emphasis on the promotion of economic development. A 
central bank with a wider, developmental mandate can make 
important contributions to a country’s economic and social 
development and may play an important role in improving 
the framework conditions for financing the post-2015 
development agenda. Yet, multiple objectives will make 
central banking much more challenging, not least because 
tensions may arise between policies that promote price or 
financial stability, on the one hand, and development on the 
other. How may these challenges be addressed? 
1 A first step is to enhance transparency and central bank 
policy communication to signal commitment to the 
central bank’s objectives, to justify policy decisions and 
to ensure accountability. 
2 A second step is to establish clear monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks for central bank interventions 
that seek to proactively promote development, given 
the risks that such interventions may entail for price 
and financial stability. 
3 A third step is to make clear that central bank policy is 
only one part of the broader, integrated public policy 
framework for fostering sustainable development, with 
clear limits to the central bank’s developmental 
mandate. 
4 Finally, it is important that central bank policy frameworks 
acknowledge both the importance of developmental 
objectives and their potential tensions with stability 
objectives. In many developing countries, central banks’ 
formal mandates extend only to price and financial 
stability, whereas in practice these central banks also 
pursue other objectives. Moreover, only a few countries 
have a central bank policy framework that acknowledges 
the potential tensions between competing objectives such 
as financial stability and financial development. 
Acknowledging these tensions will make it easier for 
central banks to justify unpopular yet necessary policies for 
maintaining price or financial stability and avoid capture 
by policy-makers or private actors.  
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